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THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AT THE ICC
IN OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE USE OF FORCE (MARC WELLER, ED. FORTHCOMING 2013)

SEAN D. MURPHY
MEMBER, U.N. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION
PATRICIA ROBERTS HARRIS RESEARCH PROFESSOR OF LAW
GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL
Those seeking to uphold the international prohibition on the use of force by one State
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another often favor the idea of
criminally punishing governmental leaders who initiate such force. Indeed, at least since the
prosecution of the major political and military leaders at the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes
tribunals, many States and individuals have sought to establish a global criminal tribunal for
prosecuting government officials who plan and unleash inter-State aggression. Throughout most
of the twentieth century, that aspiration remained unfulfilled, but in 1998 120 States adopted the
Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC).1 The Rome Statute, to which
121 States are a party as of mid-2012, contemplated the activation of ICC jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression, but only at a future point when the crime would be defined and the
conditions for its operation would be elaborated.

At the ICC Review Conference, held in 2010 at Kampala, Uganda, the States Parties
reached major decisions toward that end,   settling   upon   definitions   for   “act   of   aggression”   and  
“crime  of  aggression,” and making the jurisdiction potentially available even in the absence of a

1

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.

2
referral from the Security Council. At the same time, the States Parties decided that the   ICC’s  
jurisdiction over this crime will not become operative until sometime after January 1, 2017
pursuant to a further decision by the States Parties. Even then, the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   will   be  
limited over this crime, since there are exceptions available for States Parties who wish to avoid
exposure to such jurisdiction and the jurisdiction will not extend to States that are not Parties to
the Rome Statute. 2 Moreover, considerable uncertainties and ambiguities exist concerning the
exact process for activating the jurisdiction, the manner in which the jurisdiction operates once it
is activated, its institutional effects on the Security Council and the ICC itself, and its long-term
implications for the jus ad bellum.

I. ANTECEDENTS: FROM VERSAILLES TO KAMPALA

As noted elsewhere in this volume and discussed in depth in specialized treatises,3
individuals were first held criminally accountable for waging a war of aggression at the
International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg in the aftermath of World War II. The
road to Nuremberg was an uneven one. The 1919 Treaty of Versailles after World War I called
for the arrest and trial of German officials,4 notably Kaiser Wilhelm II, but the Kaiser lived out
his  life  comfortably  in  The  Netherlands  and  the  1921  “Leipzig  trials”  of  other  officials  before  the  

2

For the sake of simplicity, this chapter will refer to a State (or State Party)  being  exposed  to  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction  
over the crime of aggression, though what is actually meant is exposure for a national of that State or a person
accused of committing the crime on the territory of that State.
3
See, e.g., Randall Lesaffer, The History of the Prohibition of the Use of Force, supra this volume, at XXX; Nico
Schrivjer, Article 2(4)—History and Present Content, supra this volume, at XXX; TELFORD TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR (1992).
4
Treaty of Versailles, arts. 227-30, in I TREATIES OF PEACE, 1919-1923, at 121-22 (Lawrence Martin, ed. 2007).

3
German Supreme Court were inconsequential.5 Such trials were for violations of the laws and
customs of war, not for aggression or any other unlawful use of force, though the
unconsummated trial of the Kaiser would have been “for a supreme offence against international
morality and the sanctity of treaties.”6

In the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (or Pact of Paris), the States Parties solemnly declared
“that  they  condemn  recourse  to  war  for  the  solution  of  international  controversies  and  renounce  it  
as   an   instrument   of   national   policy   in   their   relations   with   one   another.”7 The Pact did not,
however, specify criminal liability either for States or for individuals in the event of a violation
of the Pact; whether the norm set forth in the Pact reflected a general rule of international law or
one binding solely upon those States that had ratified the Pact was uncertain. As such, after the
outbreak of World War II,  many  believed  that  no  “international  agreement  criminalising  wars  of  
aggression was in force in 1939, and therefore, on the basis of the nullum crimen sine lege
principle, the Allies were  not  legally  entitled  to  prosecute  the  top  Nazi  leaders  for  aggression.”8

Nevertheless,   at   the   San   Francisco   conference   in   April   1945,   the   “enforcement
arrangements” committee asserted that:

5

See CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS (1921); Kirsten Sellers, Delegitimizing Aggression: First Steps and
False Starts after the First World War,  10  J.  Int’l  Crim.  Justice  7  (2012). The Kaiser died in The Netherlands in
1941.
6
Treaty of Versailles, art. 227, in TREATIES OF PEACE, supra note 4, at 121.
7
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
8
Error! Main Document Only.Page Wilson, Aggression, Crime and International Security: Moral, Political
and Legal Dimensions of International Relations 55 (2009); see id.  at  50  (“the  UK,  Soviet  Union  and  France  raised  

4
It being the original intent and meaning of the Kellogg-Briand Pact . . . that any
person in the service of any Party-State who violated its provisions . . . should be held
individually responsible for these acts, it is declared that the aggressions of the Axis
states since the signing of the Pact violated its provisions and that the persons in the
service of such Axis states are individually responsible for such acts and may be brought
to trial and punishment before any United Nations court or other tribunal of competent
jurisdiction which may secure custody of such persons or any of them.9

As such, when the Charter establishing the International Military Tribunal to prosecute
major war criminals of the European Axis powers was adopted in August 1945, it provided
jurisdiction to the tribunal over:

Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or
preparation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing ….10

In implementation of the Charter, and with reliance on the Kellogg-Briand Pact and other
treaties and agreements, the first trial of the major war criminals proceeded in Nuremberg to

many of the same objections to the criminality of aggression which had been played out earlier within US
bureaucratic  circles.”).
9
U.N. Conference on International Organisation 104 (Apr. 4,  1945).  The  “enforcement  arrangements”  committee  at  
San Francisco was a technical committee set up under Commission III, which addressed Security Council measures.
10
See Agreement for the Prosecution of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis Powers and Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, Charter, Art. 6(1), 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
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prosecute and convict eight defendants for crimes against peace. Although invited to do so by the
prosecution,  the  Tribunal  did  not  convict  any  defendants  for  “a  war  in  violation  of  international  
treaties,   agreements   or   assurances.”11 Rather, the Tribunal only convicted defendants for
conducting  (or  conspiring  to  conduct)  a  “war  of aggression,”  although  it  took  into  account  prewar international agreements in finding that aggression had been outlawed. When parsing the
facts, the Tribunal characterized the   “Anschluss”   in   Austria   and   the   German   administration   of  
parts of Czechoslovakia as “aggressive   actions,”   inasmuch   as   they   were   shown   to   be   part   of   a  
plan for aggressive wars against other countries.12 By contrast, the tribunal characterized the uses
of force against Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the
Soviet Union, the United States, and Yugoslavia as “aggressive   wars”.13 The convicted
defendants  were  found  to  have  been  knowingly  involved  in  activities  “not  too  far  removed  from  
the  time  of  decision  and  of  action,”  and  all  to  have  “contributed  to  the initiation of the war in an
important  and  ‘aggressive’  role.”14

When judging the culpability of the defendants for such conduct, the tribunal developed
two counts relating to the crime of aggression. Count one concerned the conduct of broadly
engaging in a common plan to prepare, initiate and wage aggression. This count could be shown,
for instance, by establishing that the defendant participated in four secret conferences from 1937

11

Wilson, supra note 8, at 52; see generally The Nuremberg Trial and International Law (G. Ginsburgs & V.N.
Kudriavtsev, eds. 1990).
12
International Military Tribunal Proceedings Vol. XXII, pp. 433, 536, 555,
13
Id. at 427, 445-58, 562. At the first trial, the tribunal did not address whether the wars against France and the
United Kingdom were aggression.
14
Thomas Weigend, ‘In  general  a  principle  of  justice’:  The  Debate  on  the  ‘Crime  against  Peace’  in  the  Wake  of  the  
Nuremberg Judgment, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 41, 43 (2012).
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to 1939 at which Adolph Hitler revealed his plans for invading other countries.15 Count two
concerned the conduct of planning or waging a particular war of aggression, such as the
conviction of Admiral Karl Doenitz for the waging of submarine warfare.16 Eight of the
defendants at the first trial were convicted of counts one and two, while four were convicted only
of count two.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal), established by a
special proclamation issued by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in the East
(General Douglas MacArthur), also possessed jurisdiction over crimes against peace.17 Twentyeight Japanese senior political and military leaders were brought before the tribunal; count one
charged them as "leaders, organizers, instigators, or accomplices in the formulation or execution
of a common plan or conspiracy . . . to wage wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of
international law," while other counts concerned waging unprovoked war specifically against the
British Commonwealth, China, France (in Indochina), the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and the
United States. Though two died and one was declared incompetent, the remaining defendants
were all convicted of crimes against peace.18

15

International Military Tribunal Proceedings Vol. XXII, pp. 467-68.
Id. at 554-57.
17
See Special Proclamation: Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East, in The Tokyo War
Crimes Trial, Vol, I: Pre-Trial Documents, Transcript of the Proceedings in Open Session, at 1-2.
18
See Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (2009); Neil
Boister & Robert Cryer, The Tokyo International Tribunal: A Reappraisal (2008); Timothy P. Maga, Judgment at
Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (2001).
16
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The U.N. General Assembly in 1946 affirmed the principles of international law set forth
in both the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in its judgment of the major war criminals.19
Moreover, in 1950 the International Law Commission codified a series of principles reflecting
that charter and judgment, including with respect to the crime of aggression.20 Some saw these
steps as preclude to the creation of a permanent international criminal court, but international
criminal tribunals disappeared after Nuremberg and Tokyo. The political divide of the Cold War,
the resistance of the major powers to scrutiny of their uses of force, and the only-slowly evolving
structures in international law for addressing rights and obligations of individuals held those
aspirations in check.

Perhaps the most important development in this period was the adoption in 1974 by the
U.N. General Assembly of a resolution, to which was annexed a document entitled “Definition  
of Aggression.” 21 Though  generally  referred  to  as  a  “definition,”  the  resolution is probably best
understood as a series of factors set forth by the General Assembly as guidance for the Security
Council  when  considering  whether  an  act  of  “aggression”  has  occurred;;  no  single  factor  standing  
alone was meant to be determinative, but had to be weighed by the Council in the context of all
relevant circumstances. Article 1 of the annex stated:    “Aggression  is  the  use  of  armed  force  by  a  
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this

19

G.A. Res. 95(I), U.N. Doc. A/236, at 1144 (1946).
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the
Tribunal, with Commentaries, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Second Session, U.N.
GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, U.N. Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in 2  Y.B.  Int’l  L.  Comm.  374  (1950).
20
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Definition.”22 Article 2 then asserted that a first use of force was prima facie an act of
aggression,  “although  the  Security  Council  may,  in  conformity  with  the  Charter,  conclude  that  a  
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of
other relevant circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are
not  of  sufficient  gravity.”23 Article 3 then provided a non-exhaustive list of seven types of acts
that a State might commit that would presumptively constitute aggression, but reiterated that a
determination in each case was to be made by the Security Council.24 As such, the resolution did
not directly equate all uses of force that violated U.N. Charter Article 2(4) with   “aggression.”  
Rather,  Article  1  indicated  that  “aggression”  might consist of the types of  force  “as  set  out  in  this  
Definition,” identified in Articles 2 and 3 certain illustrative acts, and then left to the Security
Council to decide for any given incident  whether  “aggression”  in  fact  had  occurred.

Importantly for present purposes, the resolution was focused on state responsibility for
aggression, not on the criminal responsibility of individuals;;  it  principally  “deals  with  aggression  
by States, not with the crimes of individuals, and is designed as a guide for the Security Council,
not   as   a   definition   for   judicial   use.”25 The   only   reference   to   “crime”   appears   in   Article   5(1),  
which (echoing Nuremberg) asserted that   a   “war of aggression is a crime against international

21

Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX) (1974); see Bengt Broms, The Definition of Aggression, 154(I)
RECUEIL DES COURS 348 (1977); Julius Stone, Holes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 Am. J.
Int’l  L.  224  (1977).
22
Definition of Aggression, supra note 21, art. 1.
23
Id., art. 2.
24
Id., art. 3  (“Any  of  the  following  acts,  regardless  of  a  declaration  of  war,  shall,  subject to and in accordance with
the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of  aggression  .  .  .  ”)  (emphasis  added).
25
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at 38
(1994).
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peace.”26 As such, the  “drafters  of  the   Definition  thereby  signaled   clearly  that   not   every  act   of  
aggression  constitutes  a  crime  against  peace;;  only  war  of  aggression  does.”27

After the end of the Cold War, some thought was given to the prosecution of Iraqi leaders
for  war  crimes  during  Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait,28 but no steps were actually taken to do
so. Nevertheless, having begun in that crisis to exercise more robustly its Chapter VII powers,
the Security Council did establish in 1993 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)29 and in 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) 30 for
the prosecution of persons who committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide in
those conflicts. Neither tribunal possessed jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, nor did other
ad hoc tribunals or special courts that emerged relating to atrocities in Cambodia, East Timor,
Kosovo, Lebanon, or Sierra Leone,31 usually because the circumstances of the crisis were largely
internal in nature.

Creation of the ICTY and ICTR, however, helped break through the political log-jam
holding back the creation of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), which was founded
with the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 and its entry into force in 2002. While sufficient

26

Id., art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 135 (5th ed. 2011).
28
See S.C. Res. 674, paras. 1-2  (Oct.  29,  1990)  (referring  to  Iraq’s  accountability  for  war  crimes  and  calling  upon  
States to collect information regarding such conduct).
29
S.C. Res. 827 (1993); see Jean-Paul Bazelaire & Thierry Cretin, La justice internationale, son évolution, son
avenir, de Nuremberg à La Haye (2000).
30
S.C. Res. 955 (1994).
31
See Error! Main Document Only.Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the Ad-Hoc Tribunals (2005);
Error! Main Document Only.Cesare P.R. Romano et al., eds., Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals:
Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Cambodia (2004).
27
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consensus   existed   in   1998   regarding   the   operation   of   the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   over   war   crimes,  
crimes against humanity, and genocide, agreement could not be reached on what was meant by
the “crime of aggression”  or on what the role should be for the Security Council in determining
whether an act of aggression had occurred prior to the ICC exercising its criminal jurisdiction.32
Ultimately, a compromise was reached in 1998: while Article 5(1) of the Rome Statute provided
that the Court would have jurisdiction over all four types of crime—war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and “the   crime   of   aggression”—Article 5(2) stated that the Court would
only  exercise  jurisdiction  over  the  latter  crime  “once a provision is adopted in accordance with
articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court
shall  exercise  jurisdiction  with  respect  to  this  crime.”33

Article 121 of the Rome Statute concerns the amendment process, while Article 123
provides  that  seven  years  after  entry  into  force  of  the  Rome  Statute,  a  “review  conference”  shall  
be  convened  to  consider  such  amendments,  including  to  “the  list  of  crimes  contained  in  Article  
5.”34 The Rome Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, such that by late 2009 the time was
ripe for convening the review conference, which was held in Kampala, Uganda from 31 May to
11 June 2010.

II. THE KAMPALA AMENDMENTS

32

See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,  93  Am.  J.  Int’l  L.  22,  29-30
(1999).
33
Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 5.
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In the years preceding Kampala, a Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression
met and prepared documents for adoption at the review conference.35 After difficult
negotiations,36 the review conference adopted a resolution on the crime of aggression
(Resolution RC/Res. 6), to which was annexed four amendments to the Rome Statute (Annex I),
as  well  as  certain  amendments  to  the  “Elements  of  Crimes”  previously  adopted  by  the  Assembly  
of States Parties (Annex II), and certain interpretive understandings (Annex III).37

Of particular interest here are the four amendments. The first amendment simply deletes
Article 5(2) from the Rome Statute. 38 The second amendment creates a new Article 8bis, which
defines both an   “act   of   aggression”   and   the “crime   of   aggression,”   derived verbatim from the
definitions proposed by the Special Working Group. Under Article 8-bis(2), “act  of  aggression”  
means

the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of
the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall in
accordance with the United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14

34

Id., Art. 123.
For a compendium, see The Princeton Process on the Crime of Aggression: Materials of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, 2003-2009 (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 2009).
36
For a compendium of documents concerning the negotiations leading up to and at Kampala, see THE TRAVAUX
PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION (Stefan Barraga & Claus Kress eds., 2011).
37
International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, Review Conference, Resolution RC/Res. 6 (June 11,
2010) (hereinafter  “RC/Res.  6”).
38
RC/Res.  6,  Annex  I,  para.  1  (“Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Statute is deleted”).  The  final  documents  of  the  
Review Conference may be found at 49 I.L.M. 1325 (2010) and in THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF
AGGRESSION, supra note 36, at 99.
35
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December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression: [the amendment then lists the seven
types of acts identified in that resolution].39

Under Article 8-bis(1), “crime  of  aggression”  means

the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of
the Charter of the United Nations.40

The  ICC’s  definition  of  “act  of  aggression”  draws  heavily  on  General  Assembly’s  1974  
resolution, but in ways not provided for in that resolution. The first sentence of Article 8-bis(2)
essentially equates aggression with any violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. The second
sentence of Article 8-bis(2) appears to asserts, without qualification, that all the acts enumerated
in the 1974 resolution constitute aggression. As noted above, this was not the approach taken in
the 1974 General Assembly definition, which viewed such acts as presumptively constituting
aggression, but subject to a determination of the Security Council, which might conclude that
“relevant  circumstances,  including  the  fact  that  the  acts  concerned  or  their  consequences  are  not  
of  sufficient  gravity,”  indicated  that  “aggression”  had  not  occurred.41

39
40

RC/Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 8bis, para. 2.
RC/Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 8bis, para. 1.
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Kampala’s “crime of aggression”  by  its  terms is a leadership crime; the defendant must
hold a position by which he or she “effectively   …   exercise[s] control over or   …   direct[s] the
political or military action of a State.”42 The language adopted excludes non-governmental
actors, such as persons leading a terrorist group (e.g., Al Qaeda), leaders of an insurgency, or
industrialists in a country even if they have substantial involvement in and influence upon
governmental conduct.43 Like  Nuremberg,  the  “planning”,  “preparation”,  or  “initiation”  of  an  act
of   aggression   falls   within   the   scope   of   the   crime;;   the   term   “execution”   is   used   in   place   of  
Nuremberg’s  “waging”  of  a  war.  Unlike Nuremberg, there is no requirement the conduct relate
to   a   “war   of   aggression.”   Rather, all acts falling within the scope of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, including those set forth in Resolution 3314, may serve as a basis for finding a crime of
aggression, so long as they are a   “manifest”   violation   of   the   Charter. The requirement of a
“manifest”   violation   is   not   found   in   the U.N. Charter or in the General   Assembly’s   1974  
resolution, so it presents a new standard that will be discussed further below.

The third amendment creates a new Article 15bis, which addresses the ability of the ICC
to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in a given situation based on either a referral
by  a  State  or  the  prosecutor’s  own  initiative  (proprio motu).44 The fourth amendment provides

41

For a discussion of the alteration at Kampala of the 1974 language, see Stefan Barriga, Negotiating the
Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, in THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, supra
note 36, 3 at 26.
42
Error! Main Document Only.See Roger S. Clark, Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court Considered at the first Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May-11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J.
INT’L L. 689, 696-97 (2010).
43
Mauro Politi, The ICC and the Crime of Aggression, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 267, 285 -87 (2012).
44
RC/Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 15bis.
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for exercise of such jurisdiction when the Security Council refers to the ICC a situation in which
the crime of aggression appears to have been committed.45

These amendments addressed several outstanding issues concerning how the crime of
aggression would operate before the International Criminal Court, but leave open many others,
both in terms of procedure and substance.

III. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Rome Statute Article 121(5) Provides the Process for Entry into Force

According to the resolution on aggression that was adopted at Kampala, all the
amendments concerning the crime of aggression “are   subject   to   ratification or acceptance and
shall  enter  into  force  in  accordance  with  article  121,  paragraph  5”  of  the  Rome  Statute.46 Article
121(5) apparently was regarded as the relevant basis for bringing the amendments into force
because, as previously noted, one of the Kampala amendments formally alters Article 5 of the
Rome Statute,47 and Article 121(5) applies to “any”   amendment   to   Article 5. 48 Article 121(5)
provides:

Any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those

45

RC/Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 15ter.
Id., para. 1.
47
Supra note 38.
46
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States Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their
instruments of ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not
accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime
covered   by   the   amendment   when   committed   by   that   State   Party’s   nationals   or   on   its  
territory.

Arguably not all the amendments adopted at Kampala concerning the crime of aggression
had to be brought into force pursuant to Article 121(5), since most of the amendments do not
amend Articles 5, 6, 7, and 8. The selection of a single process for all the amendments appears to
reflect a conclusion by the States Parties that it was appropriate to proceed in toto either under
Article 121(5) or under an alternative procedure set forth in Article 121(4). That conclusion may
have been reached because the amendments, as a whole, activate a new form of ICC criminal
jurisdiction (the basic concern of Article 121(5)) and thus it was appropriate for all the
amendments  to  be  “subject to ratification or acceptance [and to] enter into force in accordance
with article [121(5)].”49

A Package Deal?

At present, States are deciding whether to ratify or accept the amendments; only one had

48

Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 121, para. 5.
See Beth Van Schaack, Negotiating at the Interface of Power and Law: The Crime of Aggression, 49 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 505,  531  (2011)  (“the  legislative  history  of  the  ICC  Statute  somewhat  favored considering Article
121(5) as the lex specialis for any amendments to the substantive criminal provisions). For a cogent discussion of
the ambiguities that existed in the Rome Statute prior to Kampala for how to bring into operation the crime of
49
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done so as of mid-2012.50 Whether States Parties must ratify these amendments as a package or
can pick-and-choose as among them has been debated. On the one hand, the package consists of
four amendments and other decisions that were orchestrated all at once as part of a series of
compromises. On the other hand, there is not a single amendment, but four amendments, and
there is no prohibition or restriction within the package requiring that these amendments be
ratified or accepted by a State in toto.

Article 121(5) provides that amendments to Article 5 of the Statute enter into force for
any State Party one year after the deposit of the instrument of ratification or acceptance. 51
However, embedded within these amendments are two additional requirements that must be met
before the ICC can actually exercise jurisdiction over an alleged crime of aggression. First, the
ICC can only exercise jurisdiction over an alleged crime that occurs more than one year after
thirty States have ratified or accepted the amendments.52

Second, the ICC may only exercise jurisdiction  “subject  to  a  decision  to  be  taken  after  1  
January 2017 by the same majority of States Parties as is required for the adoption of an
amendment   to   the   Statute.”53 While that language is a bit ambiguous in meaning, it is best
understood to mean that the jurisdiction may not be exercised until after a decision by at least a

aggression, see Roger S. Clark, Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute, 41 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 413 (2009).
50
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two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties, occurring sometime in 2017 or thereafter,
expressing approval of the ICC exercising such jurisdiction. Here, too, it is not clear whether the
States Parties must take a decision with respect to all of these amendments as a package or can
take a decision only with respect to some portions of that package, but it seems likely that the
States Parties will proceed on them together.

Temporal Exercise of Jurisdiction by the ICC

One  uncertainty  that  arises  concerns  the  ICC’s  temporal  jurisdiction:    can  the  ICC  only  
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged crime that is temporally committed after both of the abovementioned requirements are met? The language of the amendments does not say as much and,
indeed, could be read as allowing ICC jurisdiction in, for example, 2017 over a crime committed
in 2015, if at that point one year had elapsed since thirty States had ratified or accepted the
amendments. The Kampala Review Conference, however, adopted an understanding on this
issue.54 The language of the understanding appears to provide that any alleged crime of
aggression must occur after both of the two requirements are met. In other words, only crimes
occurring after the further decision of the States Parties in 2017 (or thereafter) could fall within
the  scope  of  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction,  not  crimes  that  occur  in  earlier  years, even if thirty States had
ratified or accepted the amendments before 2017.55
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Jurisdiction of the ICC over State Parties that Do Not Ratify/Accept

Assuming that the Security Council has not acted, an important issue is whether a State
Party that does not ratify or accept the amendments is exposed to  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction  over the
crime of aggression. In other words, does the failure to ratify the amendments mean that the State
Party  is  not  exposed  or  must  the  State  Party  affirmatively  opt  out  if  it  wishes  to  avoid  the  ICC’s  
jurisdiction?

As noted above, Article 121(5) of the Rome Statute provides in its second sentence that,
for a State Party that has  not  ratified  or  accepted  an  amendment,  “the  Court  shall  not  exercise  its  
jurisdiction  regarding  a  crime  covered  by  the  amendment  when  committed  by  that  State  Party’s  
nationals or  on  its  territory.”56 The ordinary meaning of that sentence is that if a State Party does
not ratify or accept the amendments adopted at Kampala, then the ICC has no Article 15bis
jurisdiction over   that   State   Party’s   nationals.57 The language in French, which is equally
authentic, seems even clearer:    “La  Court  n’exerce  pas  sa  competence  á  l’égard  d’un  crime  …”58

That interpretation might be bolstered by comparison to an analogous provision of the
Rome Statute. Article 124 is a “transitional   provision”   that allows a State Party to declare (in
language similar to Article 121(5)) that, for a period of seven years, “it   does   not   accept   the  
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jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 when a
crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.”59 To the extent that
Article 124 is interpreted as placing the State Party entirely outside the scope of the ICC’s
jurisdiction during that time period, then it would seem a comparable result should operate for
Article 121(5).60

This interpretation comports with background rules on the amendment of treaties, which
provide  that  an  “amending  agreement  does not bind any State already a party to the treaty which
does not become a party to the amending agreement,”61 and which otherwise accord protections
for a treaty Party from amendments.62 Arguably  exposure  of  a  State’s  nationals (or persons who
commit the crime in the territory of the State) to the ICC’s jurisdiction is not the same as the
State itself being bound by the amendment,   but   presumably   the   State’s   obligations   under   the  
Rome Statute to cooperate with the ICC would be viewed as applying to the investigation and
surrender of such nationals (or persons), and in that sense the amendments are altering the State’s
treaty obligations.

An alternative interpretation advanced during the period leading up to and at Kampala
maintained that,   once   the   ICC’s   “aggression”   jurisdiction   is   activated,   it   has certain effects for
every State Party (unless that State Party affirmatively opts out of the jurisdiction, as permitted
58
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by the amendments63). This interpretation,   which   became   known   as   the   “positive  
understanding,”64 argued that the second sentence of Article 121(5) only precludes ICC
jurisdiction arising under a new amendment over the non-ratifying Party when the jurisdiction is
predicated solely on the conduct having occurred in the territory of the non-ratifying State Party
or by a national of that State Party. Yet, under this interpretation, the second sentence does not
prevent the Court from exercising jurisdiction over a national of the non-ratifying State Party
when that national’s  conduct was taken against or occurred within the territory of a State Party
that has ratified or accepted the amendment. The lynchpin of this theory is Article 12(2) of the
Rome Statute, which allows the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over the nationals of States that
are not party the Statute whenever their conduct occurs on the territory of a State Party.

In essence, this interpretation places the State Party who fails to ratify the Kampala
amendments in a position (with respect to the crime of aggression) analogous to that of a State
that fails to ratify the Rome Statute (with respect to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide);;   neither   State’s   nationals   are   exposed   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   by   virtue   of   that
State’s  consent,  but  those  nationals  are  exposed  when  they  take  action  that  falls  within  the  ambit  
of   another   State’s   consent to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction. Thus, even a State Party that has not
ratified or accepted the Kampala amendments may find its leaders exposed to prosecution for the
crime of aggression, so long as the aggression occurs in the territory of a State Party that has
ratified or accepted the amendments (just as the nationals of a non-State Party can be exposed to
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the  Court’s  other  forms  of  jurisdiction  under  Article  12).  

Proponents  of  the  “positive  understanding”  relied  in  part  on  the  fact  that  there  is  an  “optout”  procedure  in  new Article 15bis(4).65 Arguably no such procedure is needed if a State Party
can  effectively  opt  out  of  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction  simply  by  not  ratifying  the  new  amendments.  In
the first instance, this argument assumes that the amendments were carefully drafted, with a
coherent legal theory understood and accepted by all States Parties, which may not have been the
case.66 In any event, there are reasons why a State Party might ratify the amendments, but then
opt out of Article 15bis, including (1) a desire to support the overall scheme, including the
definition of aggression and the role of the Security Council, but a desire not to expose itself to
the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   under   Article   15bis; (2) a potential interest in exposing itself to Article
15bis, but with a short-term preference for waiting to see how the ICC will begin exercising its
jurisdiction before doing so;;   and   (3)   a   desire   to   only   expose   itself   partially   to   the   ICC’s  
jurisdiction and thus use the opt-out declaration to carve out some areas where the State Party
would not be exposed (discussed further below).67

The  “positive  understanding”  was contentious at Kampala for various reasons.68 Japan, in
65
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particular, argued forcefully at Kampala that such an interpretation of the Article 121 amendment
procedures effectively amends Article 121, a step not possible except through the amendment
procedures set forth in Article 121(4).69

A second objection was that such an interpretation technically appeared to open the door
for the Assembly of States Parties, at any time it could secure a two-thirds vote, to adopt
amendments modifying Article 5 of the Rome Statute, so as to add new crimes pursuant to
whatever amendment procedures it so chose, thereby exposing the nationals of even dissenting
State Parties to those crimes based on the State Parties’ prior acceptance of Article 12. Indeed, if
the  “positive  understanding”  theory  of  Article  121(5)  was correct, it would seem to apply equally
to  the  “Belgian”  Amendment adopted at Kampala criminalizing the use of certain weapons in a
non-international armed conflict (meaning that nationals of State Parties that do not ratify or
accept that amendment may nevertheless be prosecuted for that crime).70

Due to such concerns, a different interpretation (refrred to by some as the “softened
consent-based regime”) has been advanced as an explanation of how best to understand the
outcome from Kampala.71 This interpretation focuses on the purported combined effects of
Articles 5(2), 12(1), and 121(3), as well as the ability of non-ratifying States Parties  to  “opt  out”  
of  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction under new Article 15bis. In essence, this interpretation argues that every
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State Party to the Rome Statute has accepted, in Article 5, that the ICC has jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. Further, every State Party has accepted that such jurisdiction may be
exercised   “once   a   provision   is   adopted   in   accordance   with   articles   121   and   123   defining   the  
crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime.”   That   decision   now   having   been   made at Kampala, all State Parties are
exposed to the effects of the amendments and their   nationals   may   be   subject   to   the   ICC’s  
“aggression”  jurisdiction  if  they commit the crime of aggression in the territory of a State Party
that has ratified or accepted the amendments. At the same time, the delegates at Kampala chose
to allow States Parties to opt out of the amendments by lodging an affirmative declaration to that
effect. By grounding itself in Article 5(2), this interpretation is responsive to the second
objection noted above to the  “positive  understanding,”  by  limiting  the  interpretation  solely  to  the  
crime of aggression.

Yet the first objection noted above appears to remain valid; it is hard to see how this
variation could be the amendment process for the crime of aggression that the States meeting in
Rome had in mind. Why would States in Rome establish an amendment process that strongly
protected their interests for any changes relating to crimes other than aggression (allowing them
to avoid exposure to those crimes by non-ratification), but create an amendment process for the
crime of aggression that leaves them vulnerable to whatever conditions thought desirable by a
two-thirds decision of the Assembly? If anything, the unusual nature of the crime of aggression,
as compared with other ICC crimes, suggests the need for greater deference to state consent
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concerning exposure to that crime, since the crime has very important and inescapable
implications for the responsibility of the State itself, not just the individual.72 Thus, while the
idea of a “softened  consent-based regime”  may well have been a “creative”  political compromise
that  sought  to   “bridge  the gap” at Kampala,”73 it remains to be seen whether the States Parties
and the ICC itself regard such an interpretation of the Rome Statute as correct.

The Ability of States Parties to Opt Out of ICC Jurisdiction

Assuming that a State Party is exposed to the effects of the amendment, a further issue
arises with respect to the “opt-out”  procedure under Article 15bis, which provides that the Court
may not exercise jurisdiction over a crime arising from the conduct of a national of that State
Party   if   the   “State   Party   has   previously   declared   that   it   does   not   accept   such   jurisdiction by
lodging  a  declaration  with  the  Registrar”  of  the  ICC.74

Such  language  leads  an  obvious  question:    the  declaration  must  be  lodged  “previous”  to  
what? How late in the game can the State Party file such a declaration? Must the declaration be
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lodged prior to the date on which the alleged aggression occurred, including the planning and
preparation for such aggression? Or can it be lodged at any point up until the date that a State
Party refers the matter to the ICC or that the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio motu?
How about up until the issuance of an ICC arrest warrant? Obviously, the answer is rather
important in terms of the ability of a State Party to shield its leaders from ICC prosecutions.

One answer might be that the Declaration must be filed prior to a State Party’s
ratification or acceptance of the amendments. The Kampala resolution seems to suggest this
approach,  when  it  “notes  that  any  State  Party  may  lodge  a  declaration  referred  to  in  Article  15  bis
prior to ratification   or   acceptance.”75 Indeed, that language may confirm that   the   “positive  
understanding” or   “softened   consent-based   regime”   interpretations   are   incorrect,   since   the  
scheme appears  to  link  the  issue  of  “opting  out”  to  the  situation  where  a  State  Party  has ratified
or accepted the amendments and does not link it to some other situation, such as opting out in the
absence of ratification or acceptance. Seen in this way, the scheme has certain coherence: a State
Party   is   not   exposed   to   the   Court’s   jurisdiction   over the crime of aggression until it ratifies or
accepts the amendment and, if it seeks to opt out of Article 15bis jurisdiction in whole or in part,
it must so declare before its ratification or acceptance.

A different question is whether a State Party faces   a   binary   choice   of   “opt-in”   or   “optout,”  or  whether  there  are  intermediate  positions  where  a  State  Party  can  opt  out  with  respect  to  
certain circumstances. A State  Party  might  seek  to  opt  out  of  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction  solely  with  
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respect to crimes of aggression  arising  from  that  State’s  military  operations  against  a  specified  
country, such as a neighbor. More broadly, a State Party might see to opt out solely with respect
to actions against a class of countries, such as any country that is not a State Party to the Rome
Statute or any country that is a State Party but has opted out of the crime of aggression. Perhaps a
State   Party   would   seek   to   opt   out   from   the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   for   a   specified   time   period   or   a  
specified subject matter area, such as uses of force over maritime resources. For example, a State
Party  might  seek  to  opt  out  of  the  ICC’s  “aggression”  jurisdiction  solely  with  respect  to  alleged  
crimes  arising  from  that  State’s  involvement  in  a  military  operation  of  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  
Organization. One   need   look   no   further   than   the   practice   of   States’   acceptance   of   the  
International   Court’s   compulsory   jurisdiction   to   find   ample   evidence   of   temporal,   geographic,  
and subject-matter carve-outs to jurisdiction; nothing in the text of Article 15bis forbids doing
the same.

The Problem of a Lack of Reciprocity

A different concern arises given  that  the  structure  of  this  “opt-out”  does  not  carry  with  it  
a coherent notion of reciprocity. Assume that State X and State Y both ratify the amendments,
but State X lodges a declaration by which it opts out of the crime of aggression, while State Y
does not file any such declaration. If State X invades State Y, the ICC will not have jurisdiction
to  investigate  and  indict  State  X’s  leaders,  but  if  State  Y  invades  State  X,  State  Y’s  leaders  will  
be  exposed  to  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction.  If  an  armed  conflict  breaks  out  between  the  two  states  with  
both sides claiming that the other is the aggressor, apparently the ICC can investigate the leaders
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of State Y but not the leaders of State X.

At first glance, this lack of reciprocity seems inconsistent with jurisdiction as it normally
operates before international courts and tribunals. In that context, the standard rule is that any
step taken by one State to restrict its  exposure  to  the  tribunal’s  jurisdiction  can  be  invoked  by  the  
other State in the event that a bilateral dispute arises. Yet in this instance, the lack of reciprocity
for ICC jurisdiction may be explained on the basis that the ICC is not adjudicating bilateral
disputes between States; rather, it is prosecuting individuals for wrongful conduct because the
State of which those individuals are leaders accepted the possibility of such prosecutions.
According to this argument, there is no problem of reciprocity because this does not concern an
inter-State relationship.

Yet there may be a political problem, in that the absence of reciprocity when an armed
conflict   erupts  seems   inherently  unfair  and   could   undermine  the   ICC’s   appearance  as   an  evenhanded institution. In any event, this lack of reciprocity may provide a strong incentive for States
Parties to opt-out  of  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  over  this  crime at least vis-à-vis other States Parties
that have opted out. The theory behind reciprocity (e.g., as part of the compulsory jurisdiction
system of the International Court of Justice) is, in part, that a State will be induced to join the
system, since otherwise it cannot benefit from that system. By contrast, with the ICC’s  
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, State Parties do not automatically benefit by accepting
the ICC’s   jurisdiction   over   this   crime   (in   this   sense,   it   differs   from   the   ICC’s   other   heads   of  
jurisdiction, for which there is no opt-out). Time will tell whether ratifying States refrain from
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opting out vis-à-vis other States Parties that have opted out simply because they see it as the right
thing to do; yet unconditional acceptance of the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   appears   to   provide   no  
automatic benefits with respect to foreign invaders.

The Position of Non-State Parties

The part of the amendments that probably received the most immediate public attention
concerned the treatment of non-State Parties. Article 15bis provides that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression with respect to a State that is not a Party to the Rome
Statute  “when  committed  by  that  State’s  nationals  or  on  its  territory.”76 This provision forecloses
exercise of Article 15bis jurisdiction over nationals of States that are not Parties to the Rome
Statute, including China, Russia, and the United States.

While many lament this carve-out   from   the   Court’s   jurisdiction as drastically scaling
back the scope of the regime, the decision to do so ultimately may be in the best interests of the
Court. The crime of aggression is more than just a crime associated with a particular individual;
as noted above, it is a crime that relates much more closely to the State and State policy as a
whole. When adjudicating the wrongfulness of State conduct before international courts and
tribunals, the international legal system is built upon the idea of express State consent, because
dispute settlement institutions only operate effectively when they are premised upon such
acceptance ab initio by States. The compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice,
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although only accepted by some seventy States, has historically operated quite effectively in
terms of participation and compliance, precisely because those States have affirmatively chosen
to opt into the system. Had this exemption not been included, the legitimacy of the ICC might
have been seriously damaged, especially if States Parties were provided the ability to opt-out of
this new jurisdiction, while non-State Parties were not.

The Problem of Alleged Aggression by a Coalition

The existence of ICC jurisdiction over some States but not over other States, however,
may well raise a dilemma for the ICC if faced with alleged aggression by a group or coalition of
States. Assume that a group of four States engages in alleged aggression against a fifth State.
State A is a State Party to the Rome Statute that has ratified the amendments without reservation,
State  B  is  a  State  Party  that  has  ratified  the  amendments  but  opted  out  of  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction,  
State C is a State Party that has not ratified the amendments, and State D is a non-State Party. In
the absence of a Security Council referral, the ICC presumably only has jurisdiction over action
by the leaders of State A (if the “positive understanding”   or   “softened   consent-based   regime”  
interpretations is correct, it would also have jurisdiction over State C). Yet when investigating
and prosecuting that alleged aggression, it seems inevitable that the ICC, in essence, would have
to assess the culpability States B, C, and D. The leaders of those States presumably would not be
defendants  in  the  ICC’s  courtroom  but,  given  the  nature  of  the  crime  at  issue,  the  ICC  in  effect  
would be discussing and passing upon the conduct of those other leaders.
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There is precedent in other settings, such as the International Court of Justice, for the
international tribunal to decline to pass upon the merits of the case because of a lack of
jurisdiction over other parties whose rights and obligations are inextricably woven into the
case.77 Given that the ICC will no doubt confront this difficult issue in situations where alleged
aggression involves a group of States, the Assembly of States Parties would do well to consider,
in advance of the matter reaching the Court, the best approach legally and politically that the
Court should take.

Security Council Referral of a Situation of Aggression

A further conundrum concerns Article 15ter,  which  addresses  the  ICC’s  jurisdiction  over  
the crime of aggression based upon Security Council referral. Once the hurdles previously
discussed concerning the ratification of thirty States and the further decision of the Assembly
after 2016 are met, a question arises as to whether Article 15ter operates even as against State
Parties who have not ratified or accepted the amendments.

As noted above, Article 121(5) indicates that the Court shall not exercise jurisdiction
regarding a crime covered by an amendment when committed by nationals (or on the territory) of
a State that has not ratified or accepted the amendment. Consequently, it would appear that the
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process for Security Council referral established under Article 15ter might not operate with
respect to States Parties who do not ratify or accept the amendments.

At Kampala, however, the States Parties adopted  an  Understanding  that  “the  Court  shall  
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression on the basis of a Security Council referral in
accordance with Article 13, paragraph b, of the Statute irrespective of whether the State
concerned has accepted the Court’s  jurisdiction  in  this  regard.”78 The legal theory here appears to
be that Article 15ter is principally addressing the capacity of the ICC, as an institution, to receive
Security Council referrals and is consistent with the view that the Council has the power to
confer authority upon the ICC to so act. Once the amendment enters into force and this capacity
is activated, then the ICC can receive referrals from the Security Council with respect to any
situation involving any country that the Council, in the exercise of its Chapter VII authority,
deems appropriate for ICC scrutiny.79

IV. SUBSTANTIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Contours of  “Act”  and  “Crime”  of  Aggression

Turning to more substantive issues, the  contours  of  what  constitutes  an  “act”  and  “crime”  
of aggression are not well-defined in the Kampala amendments. As   noted   above,   the   “act   of  

Court has to determine the responsibility of the non-consenting State as a prerequisite to determining the claims
before it).
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aggression”   in   Article   8bis is essentially equated with a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter, further illuminated by the types of acts identified in the General   Assembly’s   1974  
resolution.80 The  “crime  of  aggression”  is  the  “planning,  preparation,  initiation  or  execution”  of  
an   act   of   aggression   by   a   senior   leader,   but   only   in   situations   where   the   act   “by   its   character,  
gravity   and   scale”   constitutes   a   “manifest   violation”   of   the   U.N.   Charter.81 Since these same
definitions had been developed by the Special Working Group in advance of Kampala, many
commentators raised concerns even at that time about the uncertain and difficult line-drawing
that arises from the vagueness of the definitions. Some of the concerns related the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege, which requires that a criminal law be reasonably clear to a defendant at
the time he commits his allegedly wrongful conduct,82 while other concerns focused on the
institutional burdens that such definitions may place upon the ICC.83

Two of the Understandings adopted at Kampala are responsive to such concerns. One
provides  that  “aggression  is  the  most  serious  and  dangerous  form  of  illegal  use  of  force,”  and a
determination   that   aggression   has   occurred   “requires   consideration   of   all   the   circumstances   of  
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each particular case, including the gravity of the acts concerned and their consequences, in
accordance   with   the   Charter   of   the   United   Nations.”84 The other clarifies that determining the
existence  of  a  “manifest”  violation  of  the  Charter  requires   findings  with   respect   to   each of the
three elements identified in the definition of the crime:

character, gravity and scale.85

Specifically, the Understanding provides  that  “[n]o  one  component  can  be  significant  enough  to  
satisfy  the  manifest  standard  by  itself.”

Such clarifications are very useful, but some very basic questions remain. For example, it
is unclear  exactly  what  kinds  of  action,  by  their  “character,  gravity,  and  scale,” rise to the level
of   a   “manifest   violation” of the U.N. Charter. One possibility is that the standard will be
interpreted as encompassing only unlawful uses of force undertaken at a very high level of
coercion. If so, then the unprovoked and massive invasion by one State of another State would
presumably fall  within  the  scope  of  the  crime  of  aggression,  such  as  Iraq’s  August 1990 invasion
of Kuwait. By contrast, the sinking by a North Korean submarine of a South Korean warship, the
Cheonan, in March of 2010, even though resulting in the death of forty-six sailors, might not fall
under the crime of aggression if the Court concluded that – even though such conduct might
violate the U.N. Charter – the gravity and scale of the conduct were insufficient.86

If the “manifest   violation”   standard is interpreted in this way, there may be few
84
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prosecutions for crimes of aggression before the ICC since, thankfully, aggression of that scale
very rarely happens. For that reason, such an interpretation might be attractive to the ICC
Prosecutor and judges, at least initially, as it may allow them to avoid the ICC becoming
entangled in numerous incidents of alleged aggression. At the same time, the non-prosecution of
cases under such a high standard might have the unfortunate effect of sub silentio condoning
lesser uses of force. Every time the ICC announces that a particular transnational use of force
does not fall within the scope of its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression (e.g., the sinking of
the Cheonan), the State whose conduct is in question may seek to exploit that decision to
promote the idea that its conduct was not wrongful.87

Another possibility is that the “manifest   violation” standard will be interpreted as
emphasizing not the magnitude of the coercion but, rather, whether regarding conduct as
unlawful is clear or obvious to all.88 Under   such   a   standard,   perhaps   both   Iraq’s   invasion   of  
Kuwait  and  North  Korea’s  sinking  of  the  Cheonan would be viewed as “manifest” violations of
the U.N. Charter, since they were generally condemned by States as unlawful, but more
contested  actions  would  not.  Thus,  NATO’s  bombing  campaign  against  Serbia  in  1999  might  not  
fall  within  the  Kampala  definition  of  an  act  of  aggression  because  “reasonable”  people  disagreed
87
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about whether that intervention was lawful, with some arguing that it was permissible in order to
protect the fundamental human rights of Kosovar Albanians. Such an interpretation may also
have an attraction for the ICC Prosecutor and judges, as it would allow for ICC action in a range
of situations large and small, but only when, as a political matter, virtually the entire
international community views the conduct as unlawful. Such an approach might trigger highlyspirited, public debates by States over the legality of the relevant conduct, as a means of
signaling to the Court their views on the matter. A problem with this approach, however, is that it
casts the Court in the role of bending to the political will of the international community, rather
than adhering to more objective standards of law. Further, since there will often be considerable
differences of views about the legality of a use of force, here too the Court’s   jurisdiction   may  
rarely be triggered.89

A third possibility is that the “manifest violation”   standard will be viewed as
encompassing less coercive and less blatantly unlawful transnational uses of force. Here,
“manifest”  might  be  viewed  as  excluding  small-scale  skirmishes  or  “frontier  incidents,”  but  other  
uses of force could constitute a crime of aggression. If so, then the ICC may be confronted with
passing upon some very difficult factual scenarios. In addition to the Kosovo and North Korea
incidents, the ICC might need to assess incidents such as the intervention in Liberia of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1990, the series of wars that has
plagued the Great Lakes region of Africa for the past twenty years,   Ethiopia’s   2007 and 2011
interventions in Somalia (which   highlight   the   difficulty   of   assessing   an   “invitation”   for  
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intervention by an authority that no longer governs the relevant territory), or Colombia’s   2008  
attack in Ecuador upon guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to
name just a few. Even in a situation where the Security Council has authorized a use of force,
there may well be calls for the ICC to assess the circumstances, such as whether   NATO’s   air  
campaign against the government of Libya in 2011 constituted an act of aggression because it
exceeded the authorization issued by the U.N. Security Council. At the time of all of these
actions, there were differing views about their permissibility under the U.N. Charter, with the
positions taken by Governments and observers often driven more by political concerns than by
well-defined legal criteria.90

Institutional Integrity of the Court

The answer to the dilemma of imprecise definitions seems to be that those definitions will
be refined in practice by the ICC Prosecutor and Judges (at least absent Security Council
involvement), who by prosecuting and convicting defendants (or by not doing so) will sketch out
over  time  what  is  meant  by  an  “act”  and  “crime”  of  aggression.  Considerable  uncertainties  with  
respect to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters were refined in practice, including with respect to
crimes against the peace.
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Even so, refinement of these concepts will pose a considerable challenge for the ICC.91
How exactly can prosecutors and judges form a view as to whether a State is acting in selfdefense, in the often complicated context of inchoate threats, indirect action, and reactions that
span time and space? How does the ICC gauge whether that defense was necessary or
proportionate? Whether that defense was properly undertaken in anticipation of an attack?
Whether a use of force to protect human rights is consistent with the U.N. Charter? What legal
standards, of the kind necessary for pursuing criminal charges, will the Court rely upon?

Given the lack of bright lines in this area, given the extraordinary publicity attendant to
transnational uses of force, and given the inescapable focus on senior government officials with
respect to the crime of aggression, it appears possible that the Court will be an enormous
lightening rod for intense political scrutiny with respect to any transnational use of force that
falls within the scope of its jurisdiction. To the extent that some observers think the current ICC
case against Sudan’s  President  Omar  al-Bashir, and the adverse reaction of many States Parties
to that case,92 is damaging the Court, one can imagine the same scenario potentially playing out
multiple times in the context of demands for criminal charges against sitting heads of State or
Government across the globe for aggression.

Collateral Effects on the Jus ad Bellum
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Adoption   of   the   definitions   on   “act”   and   “crime”   of   aggression   may   have   collateral  
implications outside the criminal context, especially on rules relating to the jus ad bellum. As
previously   noted,   the   definition   of   “act   of   aggression”   is   equated   with any use of force in
violation of the U.N. Charter. As such, the notion in the jus ad bellum of   “aggression”   as   a  
particularly egregious violation of Article 2(4) – worse than a threat to or breach of the peace93 –
may be influenced, allowing for less variegation in methods of condemnation and response.
Cognizant of such possibilities, the States Parties at Kampala adopted an understanding which
may blunt the cross-over effects of these definitions upon general international law:

It is understood that the amendments that address the definition of the act of aggression
and the crime of aggression do so for the purpose of this Statute only. The amendments
shall, in accordance with article 10 of the Rome Statute, not be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes
other than this Statute.94

Even so, the long-term practice of the ICC in prosecuting or not prosecuting particular
conduct as a “crime of aggression”   may   affect   conventional   understandings as to what are
permissible and impermissible uses of force. As suggested above, adoption of a high standard
for what constitutes a crime of aggression within the jurisdiction of the ICC might serve to
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condone lesser uses of unlawful force. Conversely, a low standard for what constitutes a crime of
aggression could end up deterring low-levels of undesirable coercion, but it might also inhibit
lawful uses of force that help keep aggressors in check. Since the line dividing permissible force
and impermissible aggression is not clear, any deterrent effect upon wrongful uses of force might
affect lawful uses of force, at least on the margin where a State is contemplating using force to
help another State or to end atrocities.

For example, assume that NATO’s   1999   intervention   was   lawful,   but   Ethiopia’s   2007  
intervention in Somalia was not. Both NATO and Ethiopia asserted that they were intervening
lawfully and for good purposes. But how are the leaders of the two interventions to know that
their use of force is permissible or impermissible under the criminal standards of the ICC?
Assuming that there is a deterrent effect, then, in the absence of bright lines, both uses of force
may well be deterred, even though only one of them is unlawful. The worst-case scenario would
be if unlawful uses of force are not deterred   by   the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   (on   a   theory   that   law   is  
simply not effective against aggressor governments), while lawful uses of force are deterred.

Effects upon the Exercise of National Jurisdiction

A different concern arises with respect to the effects of the amendments upon the exercise
of national jurisdiction. The Rome Statute is predicated on the notion that the ICC is not the
primary avenue for prosecutions. Rather, State Parties are expected to prosecute the crimes
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identified in the Rome Statute and  the  ICC  is  only  “complementary”  to  that  jurisdiction  by  acting  
when a given State Party in a given situation is unable or unwilling to act.95

Activation of the crime of aggression may have the effect of encouraging States Parties to
criminalize aggression in their national laws. While in the abstract that may be regarded as an
important means for stigmatizing aggression, making it less likely that a leader will resort to it,
there may also be adverse repercussions. If such conduct is criminalized in national law then,
when a conflict erupts, each side might have no political choice but to indict and prosecute in
absentia the leaders of the other side for aggression. Doing so may serve simply to raise the
stakes for both sides, making it harder for them to find a political solution to the crisis. To avoid
self-interested prosecutions, more impartial, third States might be expected to pursue the
prosecutions, but third States may not wish to assume that role.

Perhaps with that in mind, the Kampala Review Conference adopted an understanding
that   “the   amendments   shall   not   be   interpreted   as   creating   the   right   or   obligation   to   exercise  
domestic jurisdiction with respect to an act of aggression committed   by   another   State.”96 That
understanding might help in discouraging States from adopting national laws that allow for the
prosecution of foreign leaders, leaving it more likely that, if such laws are adopted, they will
focus only on potential prosecution of domestic leaders. However, the Understanding does not
preclude national laws that encompass crimes of aggression by foreign leaders, and a State may
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be inclined to adopt such a law if it is thought necessary to maintain ICC deference to its courts
in situations that involve a mixture of ICC crimes.97 If such laws are enacted, they may have the
unfortunate effect of entrenching nationalist passions within relatively inflexible legal
proceedings, making it harder to resolve inter-State conflict.

Institutional Role of the Security Council

Finally, there are concerns about the effects of this new ICC jurisdiction upon the
Security   Council.   Arguments   that   the   Council   should   be   the   exclusive   “trigger”   for   the   ICC’s  
jurisdiction on the crime of aggression failed to garner sufficient support in Kampala. The
Council has a role under both Article 15bis and Article 15ter, but not an exclusive role.

One possibility is that the outcome at Kampala will help promote a partnership between
the Council and the ICC. The Council has in two cases regarded the ICC as a useful means for
addressing certain conflicts (Darfur in 200598 and Libya in 2011).99 In addition to its existing
options for responding to aggression, such as the imposing economic sanctions or authorizing the
use of military force, there will now be an option for the Council to refer a situation of possible
aggression to the ICC under Article 15ter. Perhaps the ease with which the Council may refer a
situation involving aggression to the ICC will play a role in helping to deter aggression, though it
remains   unclear   whether   the   Council’s   current   ability   to   refer   situations   involving   non-
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aggression crimes has helped deter such crimes.

One uncertainty is whether, after the ICC’s “aggression”   jurisdiction   is   activated, the
Council can limit a referral (legally or politically) to just crimes other than aggression, or
whether the referral must allow the ICC to pursue all possible crimes relating to that situation. If
the latter is the case, then perhaps establishment of Article 15ter will have the unfortunate effect
of inhibiting Security Council referrals that would have occurred prior to activation of
“aggression”  jurisdiction, if the Council cannot agree on allowing the ICC to pursue the crime of
aggression for that particular situation.

Another unfortunate outcome would be for the Council to refer a situation to the ICC
simply to avoid otherwise dealing with the matter. Confronted with a difficult situation of
transnational armed conflict, the Council might find it attractive to send the matter to the ICC so
as   to   simply   move   it   off   the   Council’s   agenda—“burying”   in   a   years-long legal process at the
ICC. In other words, it is possible that the Council might use the referral process as a means of
escaping its responsibility to address aggression.

Further problems may arise if the Council and the ICC are acting not as partners, but at
cross-purposes, such as when the Council is actively engaged in trying to resolve an armed
conflict and the ICC injects itself uninvited into the situation by means of Article 15bis. The
Council might have decided not to declare a certain crisis as involving an act of aggression,
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perhaps out of a sense that it would aggravate the situation, only to have the ICC bring charges
against senior leaders involved in the crisis for the crime of aggression. For example, there is
some support for the proposition that when NATO commenced its bombing campaign of Serbia
in 1999, NATO leaders contemplated simply extracting a bilateral settlement with President
Milošević not unlike what happened in 1995 with the Dayton Accords. However, in the midst of
the bombing campaign, the ICTY indicted several senior Serbian leaders, including Milošević.
Marc Weller has suggested that the issuance of the indictment  during  the  hostilities  “triggered  a  
strategic shift,”   one   in   which   the   nature   of   the   hostilities   transformed   from   mere   “coercive  
diplomacy”  into  outright  “war,”100 a transformation not anticipated by NATO States. According
to Weller, after issuance of the indictment

President Slobodan Milosevic, the most prominent of the indictees, and his close
associates were no longer an indispensable element to a resolution of the Kosovo conflict.
Instead, they were to be considered as probable war criminals that needed to be defeated
militarily. Indeed, this fact was reflected in the fact that at the end of the conflict, no
peace settlement as such was concluded with the Belgrade leadership. Instead, the peace
terms were established by way of . . . Security Council resolution . . . .101

If that is correct, then a further worry is that the  Security  Council’s  ability  to  manage  a  situation  
of armed conflict, which may already be compromised by existing ICC jurisdiction, might be
even more affected through further expansion of the  ICC’s  jurisdiction.  
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Though unlikely, it is even possible that, when a war breaks out between States A and B,
the Council might declare that State A has committed an act of aggression, while the ICC brings
charges against leaders of State B for a crime of aggression. Article 15bis expressly provides that
a  “determination  of  an  act  of  aggression  by  an  organ  outside  the  Court  shall  be  without  prejudice  
to  the  Court’s  own  findings  under  this  Statute.”102

This problem may be ameliorated by the fact

that   some   States   will   not   be   exposed   to   the   ICC’s   jurisdiction.   It   might   also   benefit   from   the  
Security  Council’s  ability  to  postpone,  on  a  year-by-year basis, action by the ICC with respect to
a particular situation.103 But relying on Council deferral forces the Council to extend a benefit to
the aggressor (by turning off ICC jurisdiction) right at the point where the Council is attempting
to place pressure on that aggressor, which may prove to be a difficult if not impossible balancing
act. And, since the leaders of the aggressor can never be certain that the Council will postpone
prosecutions indefinitely, they will have to react in a manner that discounts the certainty of such
deferrals.

V. CONCLUSION

Whether the activation of jurisdiction at the ICC over the crime of aggression ultimately
serves to deter aggression or to punish those who initiate it remains to be seen.104 For now,
101

Id. at 74.
RC/Res. 6, Annex I, Arts. 15bis, para. 9.
103
RC/Res. 6, Annex I, Art. 15bis, paras. 8 & 16.
104
Marko Milanovic, Aggression and Legality: Custom in Kampala, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 165, 166 (2012) (“It  
may  turn  out  to  be  nothing  more  than  a  diplomatic  dud,  a  waste  of  everybody’s  time. The  ICC’s  ponderous  progress  
in  dealing  even  with  ‘ordinary’  crimes  in  its  jurisdiction  does  not  inspire  much confidence.”).
102

45
despite its successes, there emerged from Kampala considerable uncertainties concerning
procedural and substantive aspects of how the crime of aggression at the ICC will actually
operate. Prior to 2017, there remain opportunities for resolving some of these issues. Greater
clarity as to  the  procedural  aspects  of  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  may  occur as States Parties ratify
or accept the amendments, as some opt out of the jurisdiction, and as other States Parties who do
not ratify or accept the amendments make known their views as to the effects of non-ratification.
Further, at the meeting of the Assembly of States Parties after 2016, there will be an opportunity
in the course of its decision to clarify matters further. As such, those interested in the effective
functioning   of   the   ICC’s   jurisdiction   over   the   crime   of   aggression,   and   in   the   efficacy   of  
international norms on the use of force generally, should not view Kampala as the final word on
the crime of aggression, but as an opportunity to continue to grapple with the very real and very
challenging issues that still remain.

